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Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees

✍ Scribed by Bezalel Peleg

Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Year
1984
Tongue
English
Leaves
179
Category
Library
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✦ Synopsis

This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic voting, giving complete solutions for certain important classes of committees. The solution to the problem of mass elections is fully characterised.

✦ Table of Contents

01.0_pp_i_x_Frontmatter
02.0_pp_1_7_Background_and_Motivation
03.0_pp_8_19_Introduction_and_Summary_of_the_Main_Results
04.0_pp_20_37_Preliminary_Concepts_and_Basic_Results
05.0_pp_38_62_Representations_of_Committees
06.0_pp_63_85_Strong_and_Dynamic_Representations
07.0_pp_86_108_Exactly_and_Strongly_Consistent_Anonymous_Social_Choice_Functions
08.0_pp_109_150_Effectivity_Functions_and_Implementation
09.0_pp_151_162_Concluding_Remarks
10.0_pp_163_166_References
11.0_pp_167_167_Author_Index
12.0_pp_168_169_Subject_index

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