✦ LIBER ✦

Cores and capacities of compound simple games

✍ Scribed by B. Peleg

Publisher: Springer
Year: 1987
Tongue: English
Weight: 444 KB
Volume: 4
Category: Article
ISSN: 0176-1714
DOI: 10.1007/bf00286871

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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We thank Robin Forman for two useful proofs, Peter H. Aranson, Howard Rosenthal, Kriss A. Sjoblom, and anonymous referees for thoughtful comments, DouglasH. Blair for calling Greenberg's (1979) important results to our attention, and Patricia Cook for typing the manuscript.