This essay extends the theory of simple collective decision problems to spatial games in which (contrary to the traditional assumption) each agent's preferences are concave, in the sense that the alternatives that the agent does not prefer to any particular reference alternative together constitute
Winners, blockers, and the status quo: Simple collective decision games and the core
โ Scribed by James D. Laing; Sampei Nakabayashi; Benjamin Slotznick
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1983
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 834 KB
- Volume
- 40
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
We thank Robin Forman for two useful proofs, Peter H. Aranson, Howard Rosenthal, Kriss A. Sjoblom, and anonymous referees for thoughtful comments, DouglasH. Blair for calling Greenberg's (1979) important results to our attention, and Patricia Cook for typing the manuscript.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
In recent papers, somewhat conflicting results on the generic emptiness of the core have been proven. Rubinstein (1979) has shown that the core is generically empty in the Kannai topology even without a restriction on the dimensionality of the alternative space. Schofield (1980) finds the core gener