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Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment

✍ Scribed by Myrna Wooders

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2009
Tongue: English
Weight: 332 KB
Volume: 14
Category: Article
ISSN: 1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0095-6

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