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Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods

✍ Scribed by Jean-Jacques Laffont; David Martimort

Book ID: 108512679
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 1999
Tongue: English
Weight: 238 KB
Volume: 1
Category: Article
ISSN: 1097-3923
DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00019

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