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Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies

✍ Scribed by Shigehiro Serizawa

Book ID: 108555893
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 1999
Tongue: English
Weight: 191 KB
Volume: 67
Category: Article
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00006

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