A social welfare function satisfying Arrow's independence axiom is constant or authoritarian if it generates continuous and transitive social preferences over the space of allocations of public and private goods, and individual preferences have the classical economic properties. The social welfare f
โฆ LIBER โฆ
Choice correspondences for public goods
โ Scribed by Bettina Klaus; Ton Storcken
- Book ID
- 107706397
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 2002
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 273 KB
- Volume
- 19
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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