✦ LIBER ✦

Public goods and Arrovian social choice

✍ Scribed by Donald E. Campbell

Publisher: Springer
Year: 1992
Tongue: English
Weight: 758 KB
Volume: 9
Category: Article
ISSN: 0176-1714
DOI: 10.1007/bf00192876

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

A social welfare function satisfying Arrow's independence axiom is constant or authoritarian if it generates continuous and transitive social preferences over the space of allocations of public and private goods, and individual preferences have the classical economic properties. The social welfare function will be oligarchial if it generates continuous and quasitransitive social preferences and satisfies a weak version of the Pareto criterion in addition to the independence axiom.

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