โ Scribed by Steven J. Brams; Jack H. Nagel
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
Approval voting is concerned with the decision behavior of organizations and societal systems. As with other voting procedures, it elicits and converts input from voters into a social decision. Under approval voting, each voter in a multicandidate election can vote for as many candidates as he wishe
This paper investigates the problem of strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting. It gives "strong" support for Fishburn's claim that, among all nonranked voting systems, approval voting is the uniformly most sincere one whenever the number of candidates is not greater than 5.
Multicriteria decision making (MCDM) methods generally require information that is difficult and expensive to obtain. It is shown in this paper that given an ordering of criteria by importance, and whether each alternative is above the average evaluation of the alternatives for each criterion, consi