✦ LIBER ✦

Expected utility and approval voting

✍ Scribed by Peter C. Fishburn; Steven J. Brams

Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 1981
Tongue: English
Weight: 557 KB
Volume: 26
Category: Article
ISSN: 8756-6079
DOI: 10.1002/bs.3830260206

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

Approval voting is concerned with the decision behavior of organizations and societal systems. As with other voting procedures, it elicits and converts input from voters into a social decision. Under approval voting, each voter in a multicandidate election can vote for as many candidates as he wishes. The candidate with the most votes is elected. Approval voting is analyzed here from the viewpoint of expected utility maximizing voters. Approximately optimal voting strategies are developed. The relative abilities of votes for different numbers of candidates to affect the outcome are assessed, and the issue of equity among voters is addressed. It is argued that approval voting is more equitable than the common plurality voting system.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

A Random Utility Model for Approval Voti

A Random Utility Model for Approval Voting

✍ J.-Cl. Falmagne; M. Regenwetter 📂 Article 📅 1996 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 362 KB

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Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting

✍ Yunfeng Luo; Chaoyuan Yue; Ting Chen 📂 Article 📅 1996 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 382 KB

This paper investigates the problem of strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting. It gives "strong" support for Fishburn's claim that, among all nonranked voting systems, approval voting is the uniformly most sincere one whenever the number of candidates is not greater than 5.

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Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in a multicandidate election. Previous studies show that approval voting compares favorably with other practicable election systems. The present study examines the extent to which votes for different numbers of candidates

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Multicriteria decision making (MCDM) methods generally require information that is difficult and expensive to obtain. It is shown in this paper that given an ordering of criteria by importance, and whether each alternative is above the average evaluation of the alternatives for each criterion, consi