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A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions

✍ Scribed by Pesendorfer, Martin

Book ID
108533907
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
2000
Tongue
English
Weight
197 KB
Volume
67
Category
Article
ISSN
0034-6527

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## Abstract In a first‐price all‐pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non‐cooperative delegation equilibriu