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A game-theoretic model of the appropriations process

✍ Scribed by Rod Kiewiet; Mathew McCubbins

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1987
Tongue
English
Weight
136 KB
Volume
13
Category
Article
ISSN
0165-4896

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