Decentralized admission control of a queueing system: A game-theoretic model

✍ Scribed by Kyle Y. Lin

• Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
• Year: 2003
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 124 KB
• Volume: 50
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0894-069X
• DOI: 10.1002/nav.10085

✦ Synopsis

Abstract

Consider a distributed system where many gatekeepers share a single server. Customers arrive at each gatekeeper according to independent Poisson processes with different rates. Upon arrival of a new customer, the gatekeeper has to decide whether to admit the customer by sending it to the server, or to block it. Blocking costs nothing. The gatekeeper receives a reward after a customer completes the service, and incurs a cost if an admitted customer finds a busy server and therefore has to leave the system. Assuming an exponential service distribution, we formulate the problem as an n‐person non‐zero‐sum game in which each gatekeeper is interested in maximizing its own long‐run average reward. The key result is that each gatekeeper's optimal policy is that of a threshold type regardless what other gatekeepers do. We then derive Nash equilibria and discuss interesting insights. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 702–718, 2003.