A Dynamic Game-theoretic Model of Parental Care

✍ Scribed by JOHN M MCNAMARA; TAMÁS SZÉKELY; JAMES N WEBB; ALASDAIR I HOUSTON

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 2000
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 302 KB
• Volume: 205
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0022-5193
• DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2093

✦ Synopsis

We present a model in which members of a mated pair decide whether to care for their o!spring or desert them. There is a breeding season of "nite length during which it is possible to produce and raise several batches of o!spring. On deserting its o!spring, an individual can search for a new mate. The probability of "nding a mate depends on the number of individuals of each sex that are searching, which in turn depends upon the previous care and desertion decisions of all population members. We "nd the evolutionarily stable pattern of care over the breeding season. The feedback between behaviour and mating opportunity can result in a pattern of stable oscillations between di!erent forms of care over the breeding season. Oscillations can also arise because the best thing for an individual to do at a particular time in the season depends on future behaviour of all population members. In the baseline model, a pair splits up after a breeding attempt, even if they both care for the o!spring. In a version of the model in which a pair stays together if they both care, the feedback between behaviour and mating opportunity can lead to more than one evolutionarily stable form of care.