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A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions

โœ Scribed by Miura, Shintaro


Book ID
122287607
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2014
Tongue
English
Weight
483 KB
Volume
51
Category
Article
ISSN
0304-4068

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