Back Cover
Copyright
Title
Contents
Contributors
Preface
Acknowledgements
1 Anatomy of a Muddle: Wittgenstein and Philosophy
2 Explaining What We Mean
3 Objectivity
4 The Methodological Significance of Intuitions in Philosophy
1 Sosa and Bealer on Intuitions and Their Philosophical Significance
2 Critical Examination of the Notions of Intuition and Intuitions
2.1 The Capacity or Competence of Intuition
2.2 Particular Intuitions Including Philosophical Ones
3 The Methodological Significance of Intuitions
5 Wittgenstein on ‘Seeing Meanings’
i Various Uses of ‘See’
Wittgenstein’s Two Uses of ‘See’
‘Seeing Shapes and Colours’ and ‘Seeing Things’
ii Looking at the World and Looking at Pictures
Looking at the World
Looking at Pictures
iii Seeing Meanings
iv Concluding Remarks
6 Bringing the Phenomenal World into View
Introduction: Travis’s “Fundamental Question of Perception” and the Repression of the Phenomenal World
Travis’s Answer to His “Fundamental” Question
The Difficulty Posed by Wittgensteinian Aspects to Travis’s Account of Perception
Aspects and Concepts
Aspects as Perceived Internal Relations
Concluding Remarks
7 First Steps and Conceptual Creativity
Introduction
1 First Steps
1.1 The Fly and the Fly-Bottle
1.2 The First Step
1.3 ‘Now I Understand!’
1.4 Aspect Change
2 Conceptual Creativity
2.1 Conceptual Spaces
2.2 Transformational Creativity
2.3 ‘Eureka!’
2.4 Conceptual Change
3 Frege’s First Step
3.1 Wittgenstein and the Fregean Fly-Bottle
3.2 Frege’s Use of Function–Argument Analysis
3.3 ‘Concepts Are Functions!’
3.4 Reconceiving Concepts
4 Wittgenstein’s Conceptual Creativity
4.1 Connective Creativity
4.2 Therapeutic Analysis
4.3 ‘That’s Exactly How I Meant It!’
4.4 Changing Our Ways of Looking at Things
8 Wittgenstein and Analytic Revisionism
I Introduction
II Early Wittgenstein vs. Analytic Revisionism
III Later Wittgenstein vs. Analytic Revisionism
9 Demystifying Meaning in Horwich and Wittgenstein
1 Horwich’s Reductionist Reading
2 Demystification in Philosophical Investigations §§185–242
3 The Shopkeeper and the Builders
4 Meaning, Truth, and Deflationism
5 Meaning and Dispositions
6 Concluding Remarks
10 What Is Meaning? A Wittgensteinian Answer to an Un-Wittgensteinian Question
1 A Theory of Meaning?
2 ‘What Is . . . ?’-Questions
3 Eliminativism about ‘Meaning’
4 Meaning, Use, and Rules
5 Verificationism
6 Conceptual Role Semantics and Inferentialism
7 Function, Role, and Combinatorial Possibilities
8 Form-of-Life Holism
9 Speech Act Potential
10 Meaning, Explanation, and Understanding
11 Connective Analysis
12 Correctness, Truth, and Meaning
11 Meaning, Use, and Supervenience
1 Wittgenstein’s Anti-Reductionism
2 Supervenience
3 Supervenience and Dispositional Properties
4 Intentional Ghosts and Semantic Magic
5 Conclusion
12 Some Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy
I The Exam: Socrates or Wittgenstein?
II A Time When Every Philosophy Had a Socratic Aspect
III Socratic Aspects of Wittgenstein’sConception of Philosophy
Appendix i - The Preliminary Exam
Appendix ii - The Exam Proper
Appendix iii - The Extra Credit Portion of the Exam
Appendix iv - Answers to Exam Questions (with References)
The Preliminary Exam
The Exam Proper
The Extra Credit Portion of the Exam
References
Works by or Originating from Wittgenstein with Abbreviations
Other Works
Index