This is a collection of essays on Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinian themes that appeared between 1996 and 2019. It is divided into three parts, with a common trajectory laid out in a substantial introduction. The first part links meaning, necessity and normativity. It defends and modifies Wittgensteinโs claim that the idea of a โgrammatical ruleโ holds the key to understanding linguistic meaning and its connection to necessary truth. The second part elucidates the connections between meaning, concepts and thought in Wittgenstein and beyond. It shows how he laid the grounds for a sound understanding of four contested issuesโradical interpretation, concepts, nonsense and animal minds. The third part provides a qualified defence of Wittgensteinโs controversial idea that philosophical problems are conceptual, and thereby rooted in confusions concerning the meanings of and semantic relations between linguistic expressions. Against irrationalist interpretations, it demonstrates that Wittgensteinโs method is argumentative rather than therapeutic. The collection as a whole makes a powerful case for an analytic perspective on Wittgenstein. The essays bring out the abiding relevance of Wittgensteinโs reflections to contemporary debates on central topics such as the role of normativity, the foundations of linguistic meaning, the nature of concepts, the possibility of animal thought, and the proper methods of philosophy.