๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness

โœ Scribed by Tommy Andersson; Lars-Gunnar Svensson


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2007
Tongue
English
Weight
293 KB
Volume
11
Category
Article
ISSN
1434-4750

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.


๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


Strategy-proofness and markets
โœ Mark A. Satterthwaite ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2001 ๐Ÿ› Springer ๐ŸŒ English โš– 192 KB
Strategy-proof assignment with fair comp
โœ Shinji Ohseto ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2005 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 176 KB

We study the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible objects (e.g. jobs, houses, etc.) when monetary compensations are possible. We present a new family of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Each mechanism in the family is a variation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pivotal mechanism: the