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Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness

✍ Scribed by Tommy Andersson; Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2007
Tongue: English
Weight: 293 KB
Volume: 11
Category: Article
ISSN: 1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-007-0038-z

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