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Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness

✍ Scribed by Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2008
Tongue: English
Weight: 260 KB
Volume: 40
Category: Article
ISSN: 0938-2259
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0366-4

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