We characterize strategy-proof social choice functions when individuals have strictly quasi-concave, continuous and satiated utility functions on convex subsets of IR m, representing preferences for the provision of m pure public goods. When specialized to the case m = 1, these assumptions amount to
Walrasian social choice in a large economy
β Scribed by Ryo-ichi Nagahisa
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1992
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 361 KB
- Volume
- 24
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0165-4896
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