In the present study it was investigated if choice behaviour in a social trap situation was affected by feedback about the choice of others. On top of the social trap reward structure investigated by Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan and Schwab (1983) a bonus was added. In the individual bonus condi
Social choice in a sequential environment
โ Scribed by A. Camacho
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1975
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 900 KB
- Volume
- 6
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0040-5833
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
In a recent paper [2] we presented a model of societies. In the context of that model, we argued that in the field of social choice it is necessary to consider some type of cardinal utility indices if we want to develop a sensible analysis. The main purpose of the present article is to complete and extend an argument initiated in Section 5 of [2] by giving a rigorous formulation and proof of a theorem informally discussed there.
To formulate rigorously our theorem a concept of impersonality is introduced that appears to be more general than those which have been used in the economic literature.
Our arguments concerning the need to use cardinal utility indices in the field of social choice are shown to be similar to those used by the proponents of decentralization in the controversy regarding centralization and decentralization as alternative ways of organizing the economic activity of a society.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
If preferences are continuous monotone complete preorders, then there is a continuous social choice aggregation rule which respects unanimity and is anonymous. The simple proof of this result involves a straightforward application of well-known properties of the closed convergence topology. I shall