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Variation in productive efficiency in French workers' cooperatives

✍ Scribed by Jacques Defourny; C. A. Knox Lovell; Aké G.M. G. N'gbo

Publisher
Springer
Year
1992
Tongue
English
Weight
808 KB
Volume
3
Category
Article
ISSN
0895-562X

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