Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games

✍ Scribed by Walter Bossert; Jean Derks; Hans Peters

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 2005
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 142 KB
• Volume: 50
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0165-4896
• DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.010

✦ Synopsis

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.