Preferred coalitions in cooperative differential games
โ Scribed by H. L. Logan
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1974
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 879 KB
- Volume
- 13
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-3239
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
In this paper we present the qualitative and quantitative analysis of open loop coalitive Nash equilibrium solutions to differential games of fixed duration with general parameters in the cost functions. The solvability set and the stability sets of the first and the second kind are defined and algo
Two games of interacting between a coalition of players in a marketplace and the residual players acting there are discussed, along with two approaches to fair imputation of gains of coalitions in cooperative games that are based on the concepts of the Shapley vector and core of a cooperative game.