✦ LIBER ✦

UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING

✍ Scribed by TADASHI SEKIGUCHI

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Communication equilibrium payoffs in rep

✍ Jérôme Renault; Tristan Tomala 📂 Article 📅 2004 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 312 KB

On the equilibrium payoffs set of two pl

✍ E. Lehrer 📂 Article 📅 1992 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 747 KB

Efficiency in repeated games with imperf

✍ Hitoshi Matsushima 📂 Article 📅 1989 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 727 KB

Perceptrons Play Repeated Games with Imp

✍ In-Koo Cho 📂 Article 📅 1996 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 301 KB

Unmediated communication in repeated gam

✍ A. Urbano; J.E. Vila 📂 Article 📅 2004 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 352 KB

Communication in repeated network games

✍ Laclau, M. 📂 Article 📅 2014 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 757 KB