Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth yet allows both disputants
Truth and Objectivity
β Scribed by Crispin Wright
- Publisher
- Harvard University Press
- Year
- 1994
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 252
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgments, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers interested in realism, including the "deflationary" conception of truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation, and the role of moral states of affairs in explanations of moral beliefs.
β¦ Table of Contents
Contents......Page 5
1. Inflating Deflationism......Page 7
2. Minimal Truth, Internal Realism and Superassertibility......Page 39
3. Convergence and Cognitive Command......Page 77
Appendix: The Euthyphro Contrast......Page 114
4. Cognitive Command and the Theoreticity of Observation......Page 146
5. Realism and the Best Explanation of Belief......Page 180
6. Quietism......Page 208
Appendix: On an Argument against the Coherence of Minimalism about Meaning......Page 237
Index......Page 244
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<p>Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of βrealismβ in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists.</p>
Originally published in 1986. Wittgenstein, William James, Thomas Kuhn and John Wisdom share an attitude towards problems in the theory of knowledge which is fundamentally in conflict with the empiricist tradition. They encourage the idea that in understanding the central concepts of epistemology β