Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption

✍ Scribed by Omar Azfar; William Robert Nelson

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 2007
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 554 KB
• Volume: 130
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0048-5829
• DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9101-5

✦ Synopsis

We conducted an experimental analysis of the causes of corruption, varying the ease of hiding corrupt gains, officials' wages, and the method of choosing the law enforcement officer. Voters rarely re-elect chief executives found to be corrupt and tend to choose presidents who had good luck. Directly elected law enforcement officers work more vigilantly at exposing corruption than those who are appointed. Increasing government wages and increasing the difficulty of hiding corrupt gains both reduce corruption.