Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmen
Transparency and self-knowledge
โ Scribed by Byrne, Alex
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Year
- 2018
- Tongue
- English
- Leaves
- 240
- Edition
- First edition
- Category
- Library
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Subjects
Coneixement d'un mateix, Teoria del;Filosofia de la ment
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1 online resource (ix, 193 pages)