Let S=(P, B, I) be a generalized quadrangle of order (q, q 2 ), q>1, and assume that S satisfies Property (G) at the flag (x, L). If q is odd then S is the dual of a flock generalized quadrangle. This solves (a stronger version of ) a ten-year-old conjecture. We emphasize that this is a powerful the
Translation Generalized Quadrangles of Order (s,s2), s Even, and Eggs
β Scribed by J.A. Thas
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2002
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 154 KB
- Volume
- 99
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0097-3165
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β¦ Synopsis
Characterizations of classical eggs and the classical generalized quadrangle QΓ°5; sΓ; s even, are given. The egg OΓ°n; 2n; qΓ ΒΌ O of PGΓ°4n Γ 1; qΓ; q even, is classical if and only if either O is good at some element and contains at least one pseudo-conic, or O contains at least two intersecting pseudo-conics. As application three characterizations of the classical generalized quadrangle QΓ°5; sΓ; s even, are given. # 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
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