Perfectionism, or the claim that human well-being consists in the development and exercise of one's natural or essential capacities, is in growth mode. With its long and distinguished historical pedigree, perfectionism has emerged as a powerful antedote to what are perceived as significant problems with desiderative and hedonist accounts of well-being. However, perfectionism is one among many views that deny the influence of our desires, or that cut the link between well-being and a raw appeal to sensory pleasure. Other views include, for instance, the "objective list" view, 1 the so-called "restricted achievement" view, 2 and various hybrid views that combine an appeal to desire or pleasure with an objective standard of evaluation of those desires or pleasures.In this paper, I attempt to deflate three important arguments for perfectionism in contrast with its competitors. Each of these arguments has appeared, in some form or other, in the historical record. Some have been given sophisticated and compelling restatements with the benefit of our contemporary conceptual apparatus. Unfortunately, none have the power to support the claim that the good life is one that develops an agent's natural or essential capacities. And though I will focus only on three here, the failure of these arguments suggests general defects in a perfectionist view, and should be widely worrisome.The paper will be organized as follows. Section 1 will provide a brief description of perfectionism in general. In ยง2, I discuss an important argument for perfectionism, given by Thomas Hurka, but also reflected in (some interpretations of) Aristotle: the essence argument. The second is found in the writings of Kant, T. H. Green, and is developed in its recent formulation by David Brink. This is the agency argument. Finally, I will discuss an argument that all perfectionists share, the intuitive argument: the argument that