In this paper [ examine several versions of Anselm's ontological argument and conclude that they all suffer from the same basic fault. This, while hardly surprising for the simpler versions of the argument has some interest for the more sophisticated ones. Indeed, the last argument we shall consider, Ross's "Modal Argument," may not at first be recognized as a version of the ontological argument at all.
The first ontological argument which we will consider is simply St. Anselm's first ontological argument, that which occurs in Chapter II of the Proslogion. It can usefully be presented in the following way: some things exist in reality and some things are thought of. This obviously gives us four possible combinations:
- Thought of and existing in reality; 2. Thought of, but not existing in reality; 3. Not thought of, existing in reality; 4. Not thought of, not existing in reality. Fairly obviously some things neither exist nor are thought of, although we cannot give an example of this class without putting the thing in question in the second class listed. Things which exist but are not thought of cannot be discussed without putting them in the first class listed but there are obviously things of this sort, e.g., small bits of matter in remote corners of the universe. Things which are thought of but do not exist are legion, for example my sailboat (which I have thought of owning but do not own and may never own). Things which exist and which are thought of obviously exist, for example myself, the page you are reading, the sun, and so on. Now consider God, Who is by definition the Being such that no greater being is possible. Such a being is thought of, which means that He does not belong to class 3 or 4. But He cannot belong to