In several areas of ethics frequent reference is made to value. In environmental ethics there seems to be a major division between those who attribute value to animals and plants, or to species or nature as a whole, and those who see all value in terms of human interests alone. Issues in social ethics raise questions about the value of individual persons, the society of humans and groups within that society, and such entities as embryos and dead bodies.
Unfortunately the terminology which has been used to talk about value in relation to ethical issues is a bit of a muddle, especially the use of the terms "intrinsic" and "inherent.', The dictionary meanings of these terms are not distinctly different, and numerous writers have used the terms interchangeably or with specific meanings which varied with each writer; one person's "intrinsic" was another's "inherent." These two terms have played an important role in the discussion of ethical issues, and they have caused no small amount of confusion. The need for clarification does not stop with these two words; the notion of instrumental value and the various senses in which value can be extrinsic also call for examination.
Stipulating meanings for the terms used in discussions of value will not be enough; various stipulations have been made before, and usually ignored. In my attempt to make a contribution to the clarification of the taxonomy of value and its relation to ontological issues (the semantics of value terms), I will use some familiar terms which do not seem to be problematical, but I will also use some new terms, which I hope will not be terribly awkward.
Let me enter a clarification at this point. My use of the noun term "value" should not be taken to imply acceptance of an ontology; this would be quite premature this early in the paper, and it might never be called for. References to value should, until further notice, be read as a