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The political economy of taking and just compensation

โœ Scribed by Fred G. Esposto

Publisher
Springer US
Year
1996
Tongue
English
Weight
913 KB
Volume
89
Category
Article
ISSN
0048-5829

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis

By creating an implicit right to judicial review and lowering the transaction costs a property owner must incur to challenge a taking, the just. compensation restriction on eminent domain limits the tendency of political decision-makers to avoid the subjective costs their actions inflict on property owners and moves the level of taking closer to the social optimum. Its impact, however, is partially to completely erased by the risk aversion of the property owner and the fiscal illusion of the political decision-maker, unless there are additional constraints in the fiscal constitution. * I wish to thank Jim Thornton, Bill Woodland, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, all remaining errors are the liability of the author.

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