๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

Urban politics and political economy: The politics of the property tax

โœ Scribed by Martin A. Levin


Publisher
Springer US
Year
1978
Tongue
English
Weight
583 KB
Volume
9
Category
Article
ISSN
0032-2687

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

โœฆ Synopsis


The formation and implementation of policy with regard to the property tax in our larger cities is of major importance not only for revenue raising and urban public finance, but also for the larger questions of urban politics and political economy. Diane Paul has written an important book which is of major relevance to all four of these topics: The Politics of the Property Tax (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975). Paul develops significant generalizations which are well grounded in rich empirical analysis and uses the tools of both political and economic analysis. The book's economic analysis and data provide the essential foundation for understanding this tax and urban revenue raising and public finance in general (e.g., analysis of the incidence of property tax and its degree of regressivity or progressivity). However, Paul goes beyond this to also explain the economic data by analysis of political and administrative behavior. For instance, in Chapter 4 the economic model of the property assessing process suggests that the city government acts like a monopolist protecting price discrimination, separating its market into different groups according to their price elasticity of demand for central city space. But Paul points out that the model does not fully explain the structure of assessing because officials also act from noneconomic motives. All of this is placed in the specific contexts of the organizations administering this tax and the type of political systems in the two cities analyzed.

Professor Paul found that in Boston and San Francisco (prior to the latter's "reform") there were informal tax structures in which commercial and industrial, and to a lesser extent income producing residential property, were "systematically assessed at higher ratios of market values than single family homes". 1 Her secondary analysis of other cities suggests that this may not be a unique pattern. These informal and extra-legal assessing structures, and especially the generally higher business property assessments, are maintained by negotiating tax abatements with the relatively small number of businesses which have the resources and incentives to challenge


๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


Green taxes, waste management and politi
โœ RK Turner; R Salmons; J Powell; A Craighill ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1998 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 332 KB

Interest among policymakers has recently focused on the role, efficiency and effectiveness of so-called 'green taxes'. This paper surveys recent developments in the context of waste management policy and the emergence of policy instruments such as recycling credits and the landfill tax. It is conclu

The political economy of coal
โœ Ferdinand E. Banks ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1986 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 228 KB
The political economy of bureaucracy
๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1984 ๐Ÿ› Springer US ๐ŸŒ English โš– 113 KB

massive expansion of the state to provide the third inputs (working capital, marketing services, farming advice) necessary for profitable farming and now commonly provided by landlords, overseers, and various middlemen. If the author had incorporated public choice logic into his argument, I doubt t

The political economy of gambling regula
โœ Raymond D. Sauer ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2001 ๐Ÿ› John Wiley and Sons ๐ŸŒ English โš– 740 KB

## Abstract This paper presents an interest group model of gambling regulation and applies it to major changes in the regulation of US gambling markets. Gambling markets are among the most restricted and politicized markets in the American economy, yet economists interested in the economics of regu