In this study we examined the extent to which compensation method and public disclosure inΒ―uenced information search strategy and escalation of commitment. A laboratory experiment involving 182 student subjects employed a 3 (compensation: no-pay, salary, and contingent) by 2 (disclosure level: public and private) fully randomized, crossed design. Results show that in light of negative feedback concerning performance results of an investment portfolio, subjects whose initial allocation decisions were announced publicly reduced their search for prospective information, increased the search for retrospective information, and exhibited greater escalation of commitment than subjects who did not announce their initial investment strategy. The search for retrospective information and escalation of commitment was monotonically higher across the no-pay, salary, and contingent pay conditions respectively, while the search for prospective information decreased correspondingly. This study provides evidence that escalation of commitment is positively related to the search for retrospective information and negatively related to the search for prospective information. The results obtained from this experiment complement and extend prior work in the areas of accountability, cognitive dissonance and escalation of commitment.