The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game

✍ Scribed by Françoise Forges

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2004
Tongue: English
Weight: 182 KB
Volume: 47
Category: Article
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.07.004

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The core of a further m-sided assignment

The core of a further m-sided assignment game

✍ E. Marchi; J.A. Oviedo 📂 Article 📅 1997 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 371 KB

A further generalization of the Shapley-Shubik housing market is considered in which there are m types of individuals instead of two. This is different from the generalization of Quint. These games can have empty cores. © Elsevier Science B.V.