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The core of a further m-sided assignment game

✍ Scribed by E. Marchi; J.A. Oviedo

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 1997
Tongue: English
Weight: 371 KB
Volume: 98
Category: Article
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/s0377-2217(96)00176-2

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis

A further generalization of the Shapley-Shubik housing market is considered in which there are m types of individuals instead of two. This is different from the generalization of Quint. These games can have empty cores. © Elsevier Science B.V.

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