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The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional Bargaining

✍ Scribed by Akira Okada

Book ID: 108566463
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 2000
Tongue: English
Weight: 241 KB
Volume: 51
Category: Article
ISSN: 1352-4739
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5876.00137

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