๐”– Bobbio Scriptorium
โœฆ   LIBER   โœฆ

The Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma: I. Linear Reactive Strategies

โœ Scribed by LINDI M WAHL; MARTIN A NOWAK


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1999
Tongue
English
Weight
499 KB
Volume
200
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-5193

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.


๐Ÿ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES


The Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma: II. L
โœ LINDI M WAHL; MARTIN A NOWAK ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1999 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 340 KB

We present a general model for the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma and study the e!ect of errors. We "nd that cooperative strategies that can resist invasion by defectors are optimistic (make high initial o!ers), generous (always o!er more cooperation than the partner did in the previous round) and un

Simple Adaptive Strategy Wins the Prison
โœ CHRISTOPH HAUERT; OLAF STENULL ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2002 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 276 KB

The prisoner's dilemma has become the leading paradigm to explain the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals. Here, we present an adaptive strategy that implements new mechanisms to process information about past encounters. The history of moves is summarized in an internal state which t

Evolutionarily Stable Strategy Distribut
โœ Miranda Mowbray ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1997 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 186 KB

This paper introduces the idea of an evolutionarily stable strategy distribution, which generalizes the idea of an evolutionarily stable strategy; roughly speaking, an evolutionarily stable strategy distribution is a finite set of symbiotic strategies which is unaffected by low levels of mutation. T

Natural Selection of Memory-one Strategi
โœ DAVID P. KRAINES; VIVIAN Y. KRAINES ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2000 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 289 KB

In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, mutually cooperative behavior can become established through Darwinian natural selection. In simulated interactions of stochastic memory-one strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Nowak and Sigmund discovered that cooperative agents using a Pavlov (Win-St

Optimality Under Noise: Higher Memory St
โœ DANIEL B. NEILL ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 2001 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 411 KB

The Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma is a variant of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in which the players alternate in the roles of actor and recipient. We searched for strategies which are &&optimal'' in the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma with noise (a non-zero probability that a player's decision wi

Evolution of Strategies in the three-per
โœ Masanao Matsushima; Takashi Ikegami ๐Ÿ“‚ Article ๐Ÿ“… 1998 ๐Ÿ› Elsevier Science ๐ŸŒ English โš– 287 KB

A three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma (3p-IPD) game is studied. The present simulation uses a lattice model of finite state automata. In particular, the similarity between a noisy 2pand a noiseless 3p-IPD game is discussed. It is known that, due to the noise, Tit for Tat loses its robustness an