We present a general model for the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma and study the e!ect of errors. We "nd that cooperative strategies that can resist invasion by defectors are optimistic (make high initial o!ers), generous (always o!er more cooperation than the partner did in the previous round) and un
The Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma: I. Linear Reactive Strategies
โ Scribed by LINDI M WAHL; MARTIN A NOWAK
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1999
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 499 KB
- Volume
- 200
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-5193
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