A three-person iterated prisoner's dilemma (3p-IPD) game is studied. The present simulation uses a lattice model of finite state automata. In particular, the similarity between a noisy 2pand a noiseless 3p-IPD game is discussed. It is known that, due to the noise, Tit for Tat loses its robustness an
Natural Selection of Memory-one Strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
โ Scribed by DAVID P. KRAINES; VIVIAN Y. KRAINES
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2000
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 289 KB
- Volume
- 203
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0022-5193
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, mutually cooperative behavior can become established through Darwinian natural selection. In simulated interactions of stochastic memory-one strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Nowak and Sigmund discovered that cooperative agents using a Pavlov (Win-Stay Lose-Switch) type strategy eventually dominate a random population. This emergence follows more directly from a deterministic dynamical system based on di!erential reproductive success or natural selection. When restricted to an environment of memory-one agents interacting in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games with a 1% noise level, the Pavlov agent is the only cooperative strategy and one of very few others that cannot be invaded by a similar strategy. Pavlov agents are trusting but no suckers. They will exploit weakness but repent if punished for cheating.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
The Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma is a variant of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in which the players alternate in the roles of actor and recipient. We searched for strategies which are &&optimal'' in the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma with noise (a non-zero probability that a player's decision wi