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The contestable outcome as a Bertrand equilibrium

✍ Scribed by Prabal Ray Chaudhuri

Book ID
116102215
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1996
Tongue
English
Weight
309 KB
Volume
50
Category
Article
ISSN
0165-1765

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