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A comparison of Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium outcomes in a differentiated nonrenewable resources duopoly

✍ Scribed by Gérard Gaudet; Michel Moreaux


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1988
Tongue
English
Weight
323 KB
Volume
11
Category
Article
ISSN
0895-7177

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✦ Synopsis


This paper considers a differentiated nonrenewable natural resource duopoly. The outcome of a Cournot type game, where both producers compete in quantities, is compared to that of a Bertrand type game, where both producers compete in prices. It is shown that a Cournot game yields a higher present value for the resource stocks if the resources are substitutes and that the reverse is true if they are complements.