The affect heuristic in judgments of risks and benefits

✍ Scribed by Melissa L. Finucane; Ali Alhakami; Paul Slovic; Stephen M. Johnson

• Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
• Year: 2000
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 174 KB
• Volume: 13
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0894-3257
• DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(200001/03)13:1<1::aid-bdm333>3.0.co;2-s

✦ Synopsis

This paper re-examines the commonly observed inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived bene®t. We propose that this relationship occurs because people rely on aect when judging the risk and bene®t of speci®c hazards. Evidence supporting this proposal is obtained in two experimental studies. Study 1 investigated the inverse relationship between risk and bene®t judgments under a time-pressure condition designed to limit the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance on aect. As expected, the inverse relationship was strengthened when time pressure was introduced. Study 2 tested and con®rmed the hypothesis that providing information designed to alter the favorability of one's overall aective evaluation of an item (say nuclear power) would systematically change the risk and bene®t judgments for that item. Both studies suggest that people seem prone to using an `aect heuristic' which improves judgmental eciency by deriving both risk and bene®t evaluations from a common source Ð aective reactions to the stimulus item.