✦ LIBER ✦

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

✍ Scribed by Flavio M. Menezes; Paulo K. Monteiro

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2003
Tongue: English
Weight: 166 KB
Volume: 8
Category: Article
ISSN: 1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0090-2

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

Order and price in a sequential auction

✍ Kenneth M. Lusht 📂 Article 📅 1994 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 427 KB

Commitment in sequential auctioning: adv

Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices

✍ Robert Zeithammer 📂 Article 📅 2008 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 345 KB

First-price equilibrium and revenue equi

First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model

✍ J. Philipp Reiß; Jens Robert Schöndube 📂 Article 📅 2008 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 730 KB

Seller rating, price, and default in onl

Seller rating, price, and default in online auctions

✍ Norris Bruce; Ernan Haruvy; Ram Rao 📂 Article 📅 2004 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 185 KB

K-price auctions: Revenue inequalities,

K-price auctions: Revenue inequalities, utility equivalence, and competition in auction design

✍ Dov Monderer; Moshe Tennenholtz 📂 Article 📅 2004 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 170 KB

Delegation in first-price all-pay auctio

Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions

✍ Kai A. Konrad; Wolfgang Peters; Karl Wärneryd 📂 Article 📅 2004 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 126 KB

## Abstract In a first‐price all‐pay auction buyers have an incentive to delegate the bidding to agents and to provide these agents with incentives to make bids that differ from the bids the buyers would like to make. Both buyers are better off in this strictly non‐cooperative delegation equilibriu