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Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition

✍ Scribed by Dilip Abreu; Arunava Sen

Book ID
113181146
Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1990
Tongue
English
Weight
890 KB
Volume
50
Category
Article
ISSN
0022-0531

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πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

On the necessary and sufficient conditio
On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
✍ Tomas SjΓΆstrΓΆm πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1991 πŸ› Springer 🌐 English βš– 502 KB

The purpose of this paper is to provide a constructive way of checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented in Nash equilibria. The results apply when there are two or more players. The usefulness of this constructive approach is illustrated for the case of single-peaked