The purpose of this paper is to provide a constructive way of checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented in Nash equilibria. The results apply when there are two or more players. The usefulness of this constructive approach is illustrated for the case of single-peaked
β¦ LIBER β¦
The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games
β Scribed by G. Chichilnisky; G. M. Heal
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1997
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 824 KB
- Volume
- 14
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-1714
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