For an n-member body making dichotomous decisions, decision rules can be formulated as simple games. Of all possible decision rules, majority rule maximizes the average reponsiveness of the body to individual preferences. It is the unique decision rule which does this when n is odd, but not when n i
Structural instability of decisive majority rules
โ Scribed by Graciela Chichilnisky
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1982
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 857 KB
- Volume
- 9
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0304-4068
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
When a group of decision makers with common interests faces a dichotomous choice, the task of deciding may be delegated to a committee consisting of a subset of the original group. This procedure is called a restricted majority decision rule. If each member of the original group is characterized by
The issues of cyclical majorities and instability of collective choices have been in the forefront in the discussion of social choice mechanisms. Cycling, lack of equilibria, and so called chaos theorems have been prevalent in the public choice literature. Whether cycling actually occurs in processe