Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections

✍ Scribed by H.-H. Bock; W.H.E. Day; F.R. McMorris

• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Year: 2003
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 508 KB
• Volume: 37
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0895-7177
• DOI: 10.1016/s0895-7177(03)80003-1

✦ Synopsis

committee election problem is to choose from a finite set S of candidates a nonempty subset of committee members as the consequence of an election in which each voter expresses a preference for a candidate in S. We use ideas of vote concentration to formulate families of committee election rules, which may exhibit several natural, intuitively appealing properties. One concept of vote concentration, a typification of committee strength, ensures that the associated committee election rule is strategy-proof and so is not subject to voter manipulation. (~) 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.