✦ LIBER ✦

A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings

✍ Scribed by Biung-Ghi Ju

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2003
Tongue: English
Weight: 500 KB
Volume: 21
Category: Article
ISSN: 0176-1714
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0214-1

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

A strategy-proofness characterization of

A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

✍ Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly 📂 Article 📅 2003 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 135 KB

A characterization of superdictatorial d

A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions

✍ M. Remzi Sanver 📂 Article 📅 2007 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 123 KB

A maximal domain of preferences for stra

A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

✍ Jordi Massó; Alejandro Neme 📂 Article 📅 2004 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 382 KB

A new proof for Weber's characterization

A new proof for Weber's characterization of the random order values

✍ Jean Derks 📂 Article 📅 2005 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 120 KB

A revised proof of optimality for the cu

A revised proof of optimality for the cube-per-order index rule for stored item location

✍ Charles J. Malmborg; Krishnakumar Bhaskaran 📂 Article 📅 1990 🏛 Elsevier Science 🌐 English ⚖ 929 KB

A characterization of strategy-proof soc

A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods

✍ Salvador Barberà; Matthew Jackson 📂 Article 📅 1994 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 736 KB

We characterize strategy-proof social choice functions when individuals have strictly quasi-concave, continuous and satiated utility functions on convex subsets of IR m, representing preferences for the provision of m pure public goods. When specialized to the case m = 1, these assumptions amount to