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STRATEGIC OUTSOURCING AND R&D IN A VERTICAL STRUCTURE

โœ Scribed by ARIJIT MUKHERJEE; ACHINTYA RAY

Book ID
111042675
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons
Year
2007
Tongue
English
Weight
99 KB
Volume
75
Category
Article
ISSN
1463-6786

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